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by- Thomas I. Emerson*
The basic premise of the Equal Rights Amendment is that sex should
not be a factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of men. Most
of us, I think, agree with this fundamental proposition. For example,
virtually everybody would consider it unjust and irrational to provide by
law that a person could not go to law school or be admitted to the practice
of law because of his or her sex. The reason is that admission to the bar
ought to depend upon legal training, competence in the law, moral
character, and similar factors. Some women meet these qualifications and
some do not; some men meet these qualifications and some do not. But
the issue should be decided on an individual, not a group, basis. The fact
of maleness or femaleness should be irrelevant. This remains true whether
or not there are more men than women who qualify. It likewise remains
true even if there be no women who presently qualify, because women
potentially qualify and might do so under different conditions of
education and upbringing. The law, in short, owes an obligation to treat
females as persons, not statistical abstracts.
What is true of admission to the bar is true of all legal rights. If we
examine the various areas of the law one by one we will, I believe, reach
the same conclusion in every case. Sex is an impermissible category by
which to determine the right to a minimum wage, the custody of children,
the obligation to refrain from taking the life of another, and so on. The
law should be concerned with the right to a living wage for all, the welfare
of the particular child, the protection of citizens from murder-that is,
with the real issues-not with stereotypes about one or the other half of
the human race.
The fundamental principle underlying the Equal Rights Amendment,
then, is that the law must deal with the individual attributes of the
particular person, rather than make broad classifications based upon the
irrelevant factor of sex. The aim of the Equal Rights Amendment is simply
to establish these philosophic truths as principles of law.
It should be noted at this point that there is one type of situation
where the law may properly focus on a sexual characteristic. When the
legal system deals directly with a physical characteristic that is unique to
one sex, in a certain sense, the individual obtains a benefit or is subject to
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a restriction because he or she belongs to one or the other sex. Thus a law
providing for payment of the medical costs of child-bearing would cover
only women, and a law relating to sperm banks would apply only to men.
Such legislation cannot be said to deny equal rights to the other sex. There
is no basis here for seeking or achieving equality.
Instances of this kind, involving legislation directly concerned with
physical differences found either in all women or in all men, are relatively
rare. They may be distinguished from cases where the physical
characteristic is not unique to one sex, and from cases of real or assumed
psychological or social differences. A legislative distinction between sexes
based on some physical characteristic not unique to one seems clearly
inappropriate. Consider a determination that only men may be licensed to
drive cmmercial vehicles because they are presumed to be stronger.
Insofar as superior strength is not a characteristic of all men, such a
determination unreasonably and thus unjustifiably discriminates against
large numbers of women. Psychological and social differences between the
sexes are similarly unjustifiable bases for discrimination since there is no
clear evidence that such traits are unique to one sex or the other. Unless
the difference is one that is characteristic of all women and no men, or all
men and no women, it is not the sex factor but the individual factor which
should be determinative.
The theoretical basis for prohibiting differential treatment in the law
based upon sex is thus quite clear. The practical reasons for doing so are
equally compelling. History and experience have taught us that a legal
system which undertakes to confer benefits or impose obligations on the
basis of sex inevitably is repressive. It is perhaps too much to expect that
the sex which wields the greater influence in formulating the law will not
use its power to entrench its position at the expense of the other. At least
this has been the outcome of sex differentiation in the American legal
system.
The facts are rather well-known by now, and it suffices here simply to
make brief reference to conditions in two areas: jury service and
employment. At present only twenty-two states and the District of
Columbia permit women to claim exemptions not available to men. Of
these, eleven states permit a women to be excused solely on the basis of
her sex. Rhode Island further provides that women shall be included in
jury service only when courthouse facilities permit! Louisiana still
requires that women come forward specially and register their desire to be
called for jury duty before they may be considered.2 A similar statute was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1961. 3
'R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-9-11 (1969).
2La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3055 (1968).3Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
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Women have always been discriminated against in employment, not
only in terms of remuneration, but also in outright exclusion from certain
occupations. Statutes which have been upheld range from denial of the
right to practice law,4 to an Oregon statute prohibiting women from
participating in wrestling competitions,' which was upheld against
fourteenth amendment challenge in 1956.6 Twenty-six states have laws or
regulations that prohibit the employment of adult women in specified
occupations or industries. Ohio, for example, prohibits the employment of
women as crossing watchmen, section hands, express drivers, metal
molders, bellhops, gas-or electric-meter readers; in shoeshining parlors,
bowling alleys as pinsetters, poolrooms; in delivery service on motor
propelled vehicles of over one ton capacity; in operating certain freight or
baggage elevators; in baggage and freight handling, by means of
handtrucks, trucking and handling heavy materials of any kind; and in
blast furnaces, smelters and quarries, except in offices thereof.7 Nine states
prohibit women from mixing, selling or dispensing alcoholic beverages for
on-premises consumption. In Goesaert v. Cleary' the United States
Supreme Court upheld one such law in a far-reaching opinion, proclaiming
that "[t] he fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men
have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men
have long practiced, does not preclude the states from drawing a sharp line
between the sexes, certainly in such matters as the regulation of the liquor
traffic." 9 The statute in question did not exclude all women, but only
those who were not wives or daughters of male owners of bars.1 o
Similarly, businesswomen labor under significant restrictions derived
from common law provisions under which married women were virtually
legal nonentities. In four states court sanction and, in some cases, the
husband's consent is required for a wife's legal venture into an
independent business. In addition, Massachusetts requires a married
women or her husband to file a certificate with the city or town clerk's
office to safeguard her business property from being liable for her
husband's debts.1
It is unnecessary to press these matiers further. That our present legal
system grossly discriminates against women cannot seriously be
4 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1872); In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116
(1894).
sOre. Rev. Stat. § 463.130 (1969).6 State v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 300 P.2d 455 (1956).7 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4107.43 (Page 1965).
'335 U.S. 464 (1948).
9Id., at 466.
10 No. 133, § 19a, [1945] Pub. Acts. of Mich. 146-47,repealed by, No. 206, § 1,
[1955] Pub. Acts of Mich. 308.
11Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 262, § 34(46) (1959).
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questioned. The major portion of that indictment is indeed admitted by
most observers, and the critical need for substantial and immediate
revisions in our legal structure is likewise conceded. The only remaining
issue concerns the method which should be utilized to achieve reform.
There appear to be three basic methods by which discrimination against
women can be eliminated from our legal system. The first, the legislative
approach, must begin with the repeal or revision of each separate piece of
existing legislation through action by the federal, state and local
legislatures having jurisdiction, and change of each separate administrative
rule or practice through similar action by every federal, state and local
executive agency concerned with administration. It goes without saying
that such a procedure would involve interminable delay. It is unlikely that
proponents of women's rights will be able to eliminate all discriminatory
statutes and practices when forced to fight over every separate issue on
innumerable fronts. Even if such an effort were successful, it would have
no prospective effect, and there would be no protection against future
discriminatory legislation and practices. The legislative approach then lacks
any guarantee of ultimate success. The struggle would be justified only if
no other course of action were possible.
A second method is through court action under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and the comparable provision of the
fifth. This procedure has the advantage of affording a more broad-scale
attack upon the problem, with a single agency of government, the United
States Supreme Court, playing the primary role. Moreover, some progress
has already been made. It is of course recognized that women are
",persons" 1 2 within the embrace of the fourteenth and fifth amendments,
and are entitled to "equal protection of the laws" under those
provisions. 3 Some state and lower federal courts have rendered important
decisions upholding equality of rights for women under the existing
constitutional provisions. 4 I feel reasonably confident that in the long
run the United States Supreme Court would reach a position very close to
or identical with that of the proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment.
Nevertheless, there are serious drawbacks to this approach.
In the first place there are some Supreme Court decisions and some
lower court cases which move in the wrong direction.' 5 The task of
1 2 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
1 3 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).14 Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va.
1970); United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968);
White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430
Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
1 5 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Gnienwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968);
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overcoming or distinguishing these decisions could be a long and arduous
one. There is, in short, a certain amount of legal deadwood which would
have to be cleared away before the courts could make clear-cut and rapid
progress. In the second place the Supreme Court has been subjected over a
period of time to powerful attack for moving too fast and too far in
frontier areas of the law. The Court may consequently be somewhat
reluctant to take the lead in bringing about another major social reform,
regardless of how constitutionally justified that reform may appear to be.
Hence it would be important for the courts, in performing such a task, to
have the moral support of the other institutions of government and the
people as a whole.
Thirdly, and most important, the problems involved in building a
legislative framework assuring equality of rights to women are somewhat
different from those which the courts have faced in other areas of equal
protection law. In ordinary cases, when a claim is made that equal
protection of the laws has been denied, the Supreme Court will apply the
rule that differential treatment is valid providing there is a reasonable basis
for the classification; and the Court will accept the legislative judgment
that the classification is reasonable unless that judgment is beyond the pale
of rationality. Yet such a legal doctrine is not appropriate where the
differential treatment is based on sex. For reasons stated above,
classification by sex, except where the law pertains to a unique physical
characteristic of one sex, ought always to be regarded as unreasonable. It
would be inappropriate, time consuming, and ultimately futile for the
courts to investigate in each case whether a legislature was justified in
deciding that a particular piece of legislation or administrative practice
favored women, disfavored women, benefited society as a whole, and so
on. That decision-namely, that all discrimination is outlawed-must be
fundamental and not subject to relitigation.
In cases where differential treatment is based upon race, the courts have
developed a special rule under the equal protection clause. 1 6 In racial
cases the constitutional doctrine is that classification by race is a "suspect"
classification, and the legislature has the burden of showing that it is not
an "invidious" or harmful classification or that it is justified by the most
compelling reasons. Yet, taken as a whole, the problems of race
discrimination are somewhat different from those of sex discrimination.
For example, questions of benevolent quotas, compensatory treatment,
United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); KIohn v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 219 Tenn. 37, 406 S.W.2d 166 (1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 970 (1967).
16Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
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culture bias in psychological testing, separatism, and other issues may need
differing treatment. The increasingly complex doctrines being developed in
the field of race discrimination are therefore not necessarily applicable to
the field of sex discrimination.
The same can be said of other areas of equal protection law.
Discriminatory treatment on account of poverty or illegitimacy,
classifications in economic regulatory legislation, denial of the right of
franchise through malapportionment of legislative districts,-all these
present issues peculiar to their own spheres. In short, the establishment of
equal rights for women poses questions that are in important ways sui
generis. An effective solution demands a separate constitutional doctrine
that will be geared to the special character of the problem. Furthermore,
as stated before, unless Congress and the states, through adoption of a
constitutional amendment, express the firm conviction that this reform
must be promptly and vigorously undertaken, progress is bound to be slow
and faltering.
We come then to the conclusion that the third method-a constitutional
amendment-is by far the most appropriate form of legal remedy. The final
question is whether the Equal Rights Amendment now before us furnishes
a satisfactory constitutional framework upon which to achieve the goal of
equal rights for women. I believe that it does.
The proposed amendment states clearly and simply the fundamental
objective: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."'' 7 In
this respect it follows the tradition of the great provisions of the
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion, freedom of speech, due
process of law, protection against cruel and inhuman punishment, and
other rights.
The word "rights," it seems clear, includes not only rights in the narrow
sense of the term, but all forms of rights, privileges, immunities, duties and
responsibilities. Thus service on juries, whether it be looked upon as a
"right" or a "duty," plainly falls within the scope of the amendment.
The term "equality," interpreted in light of the basic philosophy of the
amendment, means that women must be treated by the law in the same
way as other persons: their rights must be determined on the basis of the
same factors that apply to men.' " The factor of femaleness or maleness is
17Section 1 of the amendment provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress and the several States shall have power, within their respective jurisdictions,
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." H.R.J. Res. 264, 91st. Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969).
1 a do not here deal with the questions that would arise in the interpretation of
pre-existing discriminatory statutes after the passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment. Such questions can be resolved by courts on the basis of the usual rules
applicable in such situations. See p. 232 infra.
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irrelevant. This principle is subject to the proposition, already noted, that
laws may deal with physical characteristics that exclusively pertain to one
sex or the other without infringing upon equality of rights. As previously
stated, such instances would only rarely occur.
The phrase "shall not be denied or abridged" constitutes an unqualified
prohibition. It means that differentiation on account of sex is totally
precluded, regardless of whether a legislature or administrative agency may
consider such a classification to be "reasonable," to be beneficial rather
than "invidious," or to be justified by "compelling reasons." Furthermore,
for much the same reasons as in the racial area, the clause would not
sanction "separate but equal" treatment 9 Power to deny equality of
rights on account of sex is wholly foreclosed.
The Equal Rights Amendment applies only to governmental conduct,
federal or state. It does not affect conduct in the private, nongovernmental
sector of society. The problems of "state action" raised here are similar to
those the courts have dealt with under the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. The basic legal doctrines that govern are the same, though
they may have somewhat different application in the area of sex
discrimination.
Finally, it should be noted that the Equal Rights Amendment fits into
the total framework of the Constitution and should be construed to mesh
with the remainder of the constitutional structure. One particular aspect
of this is worth brief attention. It concerns the constitutional right to
privacy.
In Griswold v. Connecticut2 0 the Supreme Court recognized an
independent constitutional right of privacy, derived from a combination of
various more specific constitutional guarantees. The scope and
implications of the right to privacy have not yet been fully developed by
the courts. But I think it correct to say that the central idea behind the
concept is the existence of an inner core of personal life which is protected
against invasion by the laws and rules of the society, no matter how valid
such laws and rules may be outside the protected sphere. If this is true, the
constitutional right of privacy would prevail over other portions of the
Constitution embodying the laws of society in its collective capacity. This
principle would have an important impact, at some points, in the
operation of the Equal Rights Amendment. Thus I think the constitutional
right of privacy would justify police practices by which a search of a
woman could be performed only by another woman and search of a man,
by another man. Similarly the right of privacy would permit, perhaps
9 For a number of reasons, separate treatment of two groups, one of which hai
previously been treated at law as inferior, can never amount to equal treatment. See
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494-95 & n.11 (1954).
20381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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require, the separation of the sexes in public rest rooms, segregation by sex
in sleeping quarters of prisons or similar public institutions, and a certain
segregation of living conditions in the armed forces.2 1 The concern over
these issues expressed by opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment
seems to me to have been magnified beyond all proportion, and to have
failed to take into account the young, but fully recognized, constitutional
right of privacy.
I will not undertake to consider in detail how the Equal Rights
Amendment would affect various existing laws, regulations and practices.
It seems useful, however, to state without elaboration what the three
essential points at issue seem to be:
First, the courts are entirely capable of laying down the rules for a
transitional period in a manner which will not create excessive uncertainty
or undue disruption. The courts face similar problems every time they
hold that part of a statute is unconstitutional, and they have developed
detailed rules for handling these issues under the concept of "separability"
(or "severability"). The essential question is whether the legislature would
have intended the statute to stand in its modified form. In making this
decision the courts have the aid of legislative history where available.
There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that formulation of a coherent
legal theory applicable to the Equal Rights Amendment is too complex or
too difficult for the legal system to cope with.
Second, there has been a great deal of speculation that passage of the
Equal Rights Amendment would cause vast changes in many features of
our national life. I am inclined to feel that the alarms and warnings are, as
usual, overplayed. Such great changes will occur, however, only if they are
necessary. Opponents of the measure who stress this aspect of the
amendment are acknowledging that widespread discrimination against
women persists throughout our society.
Third, it has been argued that adoption of a constitutional amendment
will bring about drastic alterations in important institutions of society
almost inadvertently, before there has been time to work out the major
policy changes required by the new provision. The example most
frequently given is the Selective Service System. But one need not
conclude that, in those few areas where major new policy must be
formulated, there is not adequate time in which to do it. If Congress
adopts the Equal Rights Amendment it will surely have full opportunity
during the period of ratification by the states to take up amendments to
the Selective Service Act. Other areas of our law, such as the marriage and
divorce laws, may need similar attention from state legislatures. It is not a
2 1 Under current social mores, the concept of privacy would extend to situations
where persons of one sex would be required to disrobe in the presence of persons of
the other sex.
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weakness but a strength of the amendment that it will force prompt
consideration of some changes that are long overdue.
My conclusion from this survey of the legal problems raised by the
Equal Rights Amendment is that the method chosen is the proper one and
the instrument proposed is constitutionally and legally sound.
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